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In the midst of the Great Recession and 
severe investment declines, the gap 
between the promises states made for 
employees’ retirement benefits and the 
money they set aside to pay for them
grew to at least $1.26 trillion in fiscal
year 2009, resulting in a 26 percent 
increase in one year.
State pension plans represented slightly 
more than half of this shortfall, with $2.28 
trillion stowed away to cover $2.94 trillion 
in long-term liabilities—leaving about a 
$660 billion gap, according to an analysis 
by the Pew Center on the States. Retiree 
health care and other benefits accounted 
for the remaining $604 billion, with assets 
totaling $31 billion to pay for $635 billion 
in liabilities. Pension funding shortfalls 
surpassed funding gaps for retiree health 
care and other benefits for the first time 
since states began reporting liabilities for 
the latter in fiscal year 2006.1
Precipitous revenue declines in fiscal 
year 2009 severely depleted state coffers 
and constrained their ability to pay 
their annual retirement bills. States’ 
own actuaries recommended that they 
contribute nearly $115 billion to build up 
enough assets to fully fund their promises 
over the long term, but they contributed 
only $73 billion—or 64 percent of the 
total annual bill. This 2009 payment 
represents a three percentage point decline 
from the previous fiscal year’s contribution, 
when they set aside just under $72 billion 
toward a $108 billion requirement. 
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And states’ ability to meet their annual 
payments may not improve anytime soon; 
most government finance experts expect 
state tax revenues to continue recovering 
slowly in the years ahead.
The $1.26 trillion figure is based on 
states’ own actuarial assumptions. Most 
states use an 8 percent discount rate—the 
investment target that states expect to 
earn, on average, in future years. But 
there is significant debate among policy 
makers and experts about what discount 
rate is most appropriate for states to use 
when valuing pension liabilities. This is 
an important issue because, depending 
on how those liabilities are calculated, 
states’ total funding shortfall for their long-
term pension obligations to public sector 
retirees could be as much as $1.8 trillion 
(using assumptions similar to corporate 
pensions) or $2.4 trillion (using a discount 
rate based on a 30-year Treasury bond). 
How states value long-term liabilities going 
forward will play an important role in 
defining the scale of their challenges and 
the actions they will have to take to
meet them. 
Pensions
In all, state pension systems were slightly 
less than 78 percent funded—declining 
six percentage points from the 2008 level 
of 84 percent. New York led the way with 
a funding level of 101 percent—the only 
state to enjoy a surplus—while Illinois and 
West Virginia were at the back of the pack, 
with just slightly more than half of their 
liabilities accounted for. Overall, this is a 
worrisome trend, because most experts, 
including the Government Accountability 
Office, advise states to have at least an 80 
percent funding level. Thirty-one states 
were below this threshold in fiscal year 
2009, a dramatic one-year increase from 
fiscal year 2008, when 22 states were less 
than 80 percent funded.
In fiscal year 2000, when pension systems 
were well funded, states and participating 
local governments had to pay $27 
billion to fund their promised benefits 
adequately. In fiscal year 2009, the annual 
pension payment requirement grew to 
$68 billion—a nominal (non-inflation-
adjusted) increase of 152 percent over 
nine years. States paid $56.3 billion—83 
percent—of this bill in fiscal year 2009. 
Many experts agree that making full 
annual contributions is key to effectively 
managing the long-term costs of state 
retirement systems.
Far too many states are 
not responsibly managing 
the bill for their 
employees’ retirement.
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Exhibit 1
Thirty-one states 
were below the 80 
percent funded 
threshold for a 
well-funded
pension system.
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States 2011.
NOTE: Pew was able to obtain fiscal year 2009 data for all states except Hawaii and Ohio. For Hawaii, fiscal year 2008 data 
were used; for Ohio, 2009 data were projected using preliminary valuations.
States’ Public Sector Pensions 78% Funded in FY09
States with less than 80%
of pension liabilities funded
State
Pct.
funded
Latest
liability
Latest
required
contribution
Pct.
paid State
Pct.
funded
Latest
liability
Latest
required
contribution
Pct.
paid
VA
WA
OR
CA
UT
NE
ND
IA
NY
TX
MO
FL
NC
GA
PA
HI
Alabama $41,634,554 74% $1,214,983 100%
Alaska 15,347,768 61 268,127 110
Arizona 44,078,394 78 1,141,602 101
Arkansas 22,698,906 78 534,954 103
California 490,585,000 81 12,422,673 82
Colorado 54,536,549 69 1,310,315 66
Connecticut 41,311,400 62 1,307,200 96
Delaware 7,615,166 94 148,940 97
Florida 141,485,280 84 2,928,569 108
Georgia 79,898,410 87 1,316,048 100
Hawaii 16,549,069 69 488,770 104
Idaho 12,057,500 74 235,626 132
Illinois 126,435,510 51 4,076,467 71
Indiana 36,924,845 67 1,293,765 103
Iowa 26,602,516 81 495,196 87
Kansas 21,138,206 64 660,833 68
Kentucky 35,686,737 58 964,979 58
Louisiana 39,657,924 60 1,375,288 97
Maine 14,410,000 73 331,700 100
Maryland 53,054,565 65 1,338,342 84
Massachusetts 61,140,335 68 1,968,259 66
Michigan 72,911,900 79 1,381,577 100
Minnesota 60,835,351 77 1,128,407 78
Mississippi 31,386,747 67 741,520 100
Missouri 55,314,996 79 1,225,512 90
Montana $10,271,027 74% $196,002 92%
Nebraska 9,427,370 88 180,411 100
Nevada 33,148,347 72 1,344,489 90
New Hampshire 8,475,062 58 262,984 75
New Jersey 134,928,225 66 4,053,524 36
New Mexico 29,003,362 76 683,886 93
New York 146,733,000 101 2,456,223 100
North Carolina 76,976,542 97 762,442 100
North Dakota 4,475,800 81 83,339 80
Ohio 171,194,371 66 2,565,450 94
Oklahoma 34,815,244 57 1,346,040 77
Oregon 56,810,600 86 630,800 100
Pennsylvania 111,317,700 81 2,405,156 31
Rhode Island 11,500,425 59 320,173 100
South Carolina 42,050,701 69 966,538 100
South Dakota 7,494,895 92 95,280 100
Tennessee 35,198,741 90 836,911 100
Texas 155,679,204 84 2,611,397 99
Utah 24,299,183 86 665,235 100
Vermont 4,012,955 73 68,615 93
Virginia 69,135,000 80 1,608,466 82
Washington 57,754,700 99 1,829,700 73
West Virginia 14,266,419 56 541,482 96
Wisconsin 79,104,600 100 699,300 100
Wyoming  7,401,614 89 169,712 63
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States with at least 80% of pension liabilities funded in fiscal year 2008, but less than 80% in fiscal year 2009.
Figures are in thousands.
Pew Center on the StateS4
Record investment losses characterized 
fiscal year 2009: The nation’s pension 
plans suffered a median 19.1 percent drop 
in their assets’ market value.2 For most 
states, whose fiscal year 2009 began on 
July 1, 2008 and ended on June 30, 2009, 
these data capture the worst effects of the 
financial crisis. More recently, many plans 
have reported double-digit investment 
gains for fiscal year 2010.3
Fiscal Year 2010 Numbers
At this writing, fiscal year 2010 data 
are available for just 16 states, but the 
information suggests great variation.4 
These states represented more than a 
quarter of the U.S. population in 2009. 
Collectively, the average funding level 
across the 16 states fell slightly, from 77 
percent in fiscal year 2009 to 75 percent 
in fiscal year 2010. Ten of the states 
saw their pension funding levels further 
decline, ranging from 1 percentage point 
in Maryland and Texas to 9 percentage 
points in North Dakota. Three states’ 
pension systems rebounded, with funding 
level increases ranging from 2 percentage 
points in Vermont to a 5 percentage point 
upswing in Idaho.
This variation reflects, in part, differences 
in the time of year that states recognized 
investment gains. It also is caused by 
states’ smoothing policies, which involve 
Mixed Picture: FY10 Data Show Investment Gains,
Recession’s Legacy
For the 16 states for which fiscal year 2010 data are now available, the average pension 
funding level fell slightly to 75 percent from 77 percent the previous year. 
Figures are in thousands.
State
Pension liability Pct. funded Required contribution Pct. paid
FY10 FY09 FY10 FY09 FY10 FY09 FY10 FY09
Connecticut $44,826,900 $41,311,400 53% 62% $1,472,000 $1,307,200 87% 96%
delaware 7,922,174 7,615,166 92 94 148,586 148,940 97 97
Florida 148,116,907 141,485,280 82 84 2,860,448 2,928,569 107 108
idaho 12,513,200 12,057,500 79 74 262,100 235,626 114 132
iowa 27,057,850 26,602,516 81 81 524,877 495,196 89 87
Kentucky 37,006,999 35,686,737 54 58 1,023,898 964,979 58 58
louisiana 41,356,966 39,657,924 56 60 1,599,612 1,375,288 84 97
maine 14,799,200 14,410,000 70 73 330,300 331,700 103 100
maryland 54,498,265 53,054,565 64 65 1,544,873 1,338,342 87 84
minnesota 57,604,243 60,835,351 80 77 1,276,570 1,128,407 67 78
nevada 35,163,755 33,148,347 70 72 1,394,802 1,344,489 92 90
new hampshire 8,953,932 8,475,062 58 58 269,677 262,984 100 75
north dakota 4,977,500 4,475,800 72 81 107,524 83,339 66 80
tennessee 35,198,741 35,198,741 90 90 836,727 836,911 100 100
texas 163,416,523 155,679,204 83 84 3,363,531 2,611,397 82 99
Vermont 4,090,328 4,012,955 75 73 89,514 68,615 94 93
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States 2011.
Exhibit 2
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spreading investment returns out over 
time to avoid extreme year-over-year 
changes in funding levels and required 
contributions. For example, because Idaho 
does not smooth returns, its unfunded 
liability increased by $2.4 billion between 
fiscal years 2008 and 2009, but then 
recovered by $471 million in fiscal year 
2010. These were dramatic swings for 
a state with a relatively small pension 
system. Meanwhile, Maryland, which 
smoothes, experienced losses between 
fiscal years 2008 and 2009 that were 
milder, but the state continued to see its 
funding level drop in fiscal year 2010.
Overall, these results suggest that while 
states benefited from better returns in 
fiscal year 2010, the legacy of the financial 
crisis—and the steady deterioration in the 
health of many public sector retirement 
benefit systems throughout much of the 
last decade—will remain an issue
for years to come. 
Retiree Health Care and
Other Benefits
Retiree health care and other benefits 
made up the rest of the shortfall in fiscal 
year 2009. States had a total liability of 
$635 billion, but had saved only about 
$31 billion—slightly less than 5 percent of 
the total cost. The situation has worsened 
since fiscal year 2008, when states had 
$587 billion in liabilities and $32 billion 
in assets.
Based on the most recent data, states 
made only 36 percent of the $47 billion 
in contributions required by their own 
actuaries for this long-term bill. Five 
states—Alaska, Arizona, North Dakota, 
Utah and Washington—made full 
contributions.
Making matters worse, just two states—
Alaska and Ohio—accounted for nearly 
62 percent of all the money set aside 
to fund retiree health care as of fiscal 
year 2009. Nineteen states had set aside 
nothing to pay for these promises. These 
states continue to fund these benefits on 
a pay-as-you-go basis, covering medical 
costs or premiums as they are incurred by 
current retirees. For states offering modest 
benefits, this may cause little problem. 
But for those that have made significant 
promises, the future fiscal burden could be 
enormous if more savings are not set aside 
or costs are not better managed. 
Alaska and Ohio 
accounted for nearly 62 
percent of all the money 
states had set aside to fund 
retiree health care.
Pew Center on the StateS6
Exhibit 3
Nineteen states had set 
aside no funds as of fiscal 
year 2009 to pay their 
bills coming due for 
retiree health care and 
other non-pension 
benefits. Only seven 
states had funded
at least a quarter
of their liability.
NOTE: Data are the most recent available, ranging from 2007 to 2010. Figures for Nebraska are not available.
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States 2011.
States’ Retiree Health Benefits 5% Funded in FY09
Percent of
Liability Funded
State
Pct.
funded
Latest
liability
Latest
required
contribution
Pct.
paid State
Pct.
funded
Latest
liability
Latest
required
contribution
Pct.
paid
FL
50% and above
0.1% to 49%
0%
Alabama $14,919,073 5% $1,313,998 84%
Alaska 17,400,920 32 556,483 111
Arizona 2,219,542 69 137,703 100
Arkansas 1,865,809 0 193,770 24
California 66,596,300 0.1 5,520,943 31
Colorado 2,043,914 13 106,456 35
Connecticut 26,018,800 0 1,820,379 26
Delaware 5,636,000 1 498,300 35
Florida 3,742,846 0 254,754 32
Georgia 20,284,637 4 1,782,998 30
Hawaii 10,791,300 0 822,454 36
Idaho 493,746 1 45,494 39
Illinois 43,949,729 0.1 3,173,699 24
Indiana 524,859 0 54,290 13
Iowa 538,200 0 56,844 42
Kansas 236,910 0 26,769 34
Kentucky 8,754,555 15 901,848 33
Louisiana 11,512,100 0 1,196,387 18
Maine 2,625,963 6 156,951 52
Maryland 16,098,602 1 1,184,552 28
Massachusetts 15,166,300 2 1,345 26
Michigan 41,419,600 2 3,977,478 33
Minnesota 1,136,601 0 121,722 34
Mississippi 727,711 0 55,991 62
Missouri 3,321,637 1 276,686 52
Montana $540,894 0% $53,276 0%
Nebraska NA NA NA NA 
Nevada 1,874,005 1 214,937 21
New Hampshire 3,226,105 5 272,378 42
New Jersey 66,792,900 0 5,335,500 25
New Mexico 3,116,916 5 286,538 32
New York 56,286,000 0 4,133,000 31
North Carolina 33,814,515 3 2,752,730 33
North Dakota 161,376 28 6,085 106
Ohio 43,360,893 31 2,649,286 40
Oklahoma 359,800 0 48,200 0
Oregon 555,047 68 39,285 44
Pennsylvania 16,303,617 1 1,088,997 56
Rhode Island 788,189 0 46,125 62
South Carolina 9,667,187 5 736,548 51
South Dakota 67,100 0 7,676 40
Tennessee 1,746,879 0 170,142 39
Texas 53,890,544 1 4,370,235 26
Utah 456,237 13 53,969 100
Vermont 1,628,934 0.5 116,964 19
Virginia 5,830,000 26 523,161 75
Washington 7,618,372 0 706,251 102
West Virginia 6,362,640 4 148,000 69
Wisconsin 2,326,834 28 225,362 45
Wyoming 174,161 0 20,431 69
Figures are in thousands.
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Potential Consequences and 
Recent Reforms
Just as failing to meet a monthly payment 
on a personal loan can result in higher 
payments down the road, a state’s failure to 
pay the annual bill for retirement benefits 
can mean it will have to pay more in the 
future. A comparison of New York and 
New Jersey provides a good example. Both 
states had fully funded pension plans in 
2002. In subsequent years, the Garden 
State failed to make more than 60 percent 
of its annual contribution in each year and 
its funding gap grew to $46 billion.
The Empire State, on the other hand, 
continued to be disciplined about funding 
its annual bill. Today, New York has a 
$147 billion liability, compared to New 
Jersey’s $135 billion obligation, but its 
annual required contribution is $1.6 
billion less. To put this in context, consider 
that New York increased K-12 education 
spending by $1.7 billion from fiscal year 
2008 to 2009. New Jersey, meanwhile, 
reduced state education spending by $557 
million during the same period.5
While annual pension payment 
requirements grew 152 percent from 
2000-2009, state general fund spending 
as a whole rose only 44 percent.6 If states’ 
annual retirement system contributions 
continue to rise faster than overall 
general fund spending, they increasingly 
could compete for resources with other 
important priorities such as education, 
human services and infrastructure.
Given these and other serious 
implications, many states have taken steps 
recently to address these rising costs. In 
November 2010, drawing on information 
collected by the National Conference of 
State Legislatures, the Pew Center on the 
States released an analysis of reforms states 
have adopted in their pension plans since 
2001 to reduce benefits and/or increase 
employee contributions. In 2010, at 
least 19 states took action to reduce their 
liabilities, acknowledging that the costs 
they face for these benefits exceed what 
they are willing or able to pay. Additional 
states are likely to do so in their 2011 
legislative sessions.
While annual pension 
payment requirements 
grew 152 percent from 
2000 to 2009, state 
general fund spending 
as a whole rose only 44 
percent.
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Impact of Investment Return 
Assumptions
In recent years, a debate has emerged 
about the appropriate investment return 
rate that states should assume when 
calculating liabilities and contribution 
requirements. States typically assume an 
average annual return of around 8 percent, 
and Pew’s analysis is based on those and 
other actuarial assumptions employed by 
each state. Most states have exceeded this 
expectation over the long term; from 1984 
to 2009, the median investment return for 
public pension plans was 9.3 percent.7
Still, some observers, including renowned 
financier and investor Warren Buffett, 
argue that current assumptions are too 
optimistic.8  From 1990 to 2009, states 
had a median investment return of 8.1 
percent. But in the most recent decade, 
from 2000 to 2009, that figure was 3.9 
percent. The stakes of this debate are high 
because when a state lowers its investment 
return assumptions, the projected value of 
its liabilities and the annual contributions 
required to meet them increase 
dramatically. This, in turn, expands the 
gap between liabilities and assets.
While there is no consensus among state 
officials or experts in the field about what 
the appropriate discount rate should 
be, it is useful to understand the impact 
of various assumptions. At the heart of 
the debate surrounding the appropriate 
discount rate assumption is whether states 
should calculate the current value of these 
long-term promises using an expected rate 
of return. In other words, if investment 
returns are disappointing and do not meet 
expectations, states are still required to 
pay retirees the benefits they have earned. 
Therefore, some experts recommend 
that states employ a “riskless rate” that 
might be analogous to a 30-year Treasury 
bond when valuing their future pension 
liabilities, arguing that pension obligations 
are legally binding and guaranteed to 
recipients.9 Based on the Treasury bond’s 
rate of 4.38 percent as of mid-March 2011, 
the states’ cumulative liability for pension 
benefits would grow to $4.6 trillion, with 
an unfunded liability of $2.4 trillion.10
Another benchmark suggested by some 
experts is the investment return required 
by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), a private counterpart to 
the Government Accounting Standards 
Board.11 FASB requires that private sector 
defined benefit plans use investment 
return assumptions based on the rate on 
corporate bonds: 5.22 percent as of mid-
March 2011.12 Based on this assumption, 
states’ pension benefit liabilities would 
grow to $4.1 trillion, $1.8 trillion of which 
would be unfunded.
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Methodology 
The main data sources used for this 
project were the Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports produced by each state 
and pension plan for fiscal year 2009.  
Another key information source was state 
actuarial valuations. In total, Pew collected 
data for 231 pension plans and 162 other 
post-employment benefit plans. Pew was 
able to obtain fiscal year 2009 data for 
all major state pension plans for all states 
except Hawaii and Ohio. For Hawaii, 
fiscal year 2008 data were used; for Ohio, 
data for the Public Employees’ Retirement 
System were projected using preliminary 
valuations released by the plan. For more 
information, please see page 52 of Pew’s 
February 2010 report, The Trillion
Dollar Gap.
One analysis in this brief that was not 
included in the The Trillion Dollar Gap is 
Pew’s alternative discount rate calculations. 
Because pension and retiree health care 
liabilities will be paid out over many years, 
it is important for states to estimate the 
current value of those future costs. States 
use various investment rate of return 
assumptions, the most common of which 
is 8 percent. In other words, they calculate 
the amount that, were investments to 
generate 8 percent returns each year, 
would be equal to the eventual cost when 
the bill comes due. For retiree health 
care, states use a lower discount rate, as 
they typically do not have substantial 
assets generating returns to pay for those 
benefits.
Pew re-estimated pension liabilities by 
assuming they will come due in even 
increments over the next 50 years. Based 
on that assumption, Pew calculated an 
undiscounted liability and applied the new 
discount rate to that stream of payments.
Beyond the discount rate calculations, Pew 
adopted each state’s actuarial assumptions. 
Some of the relevant assumptions states 
make include estimates of employee life 
spans, retirement ages, salary growth, 
marriage rates, retention rates and other 
demographic characteristics. States also 
use one of a number of approved actuarial 
cost methods and also may smooth gains 
and losses over time to manage volatility.
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